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P A T E N T

L A W

Does the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine Apply when
the Patentee Placed Express Conditions on the
Subsequent Sale or License of a Patented Article?
by Kali Murray
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 171–175. © 2008 American Bar Association.

and chipset to the other parts of the
computer, such as a keyboard or
printer. The relevant patents had a
variety of claims that were directed
to the components of the patented
invention (such claims are typically
referred to as “systems” claims) and
the methods of undertaking functions associated with each invention
(such claims are typically referred
to as “methods” claims). Roughly
speaking, a system claim is
addressed to a specific component
or apparatus and a method claim is
directed towards a process that
allows an actor to complete a task.

Kali Murray is an assistant
professor of law at Marquette
University in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, and a member of its
Intellectual Property Program.
She can be contacted at
kali.murray@marquette.edu
or (414) 288-5486.

ISSUE
Has a patentee exhausted its
patent rights, if upon entering into
a license agreement, the patentee
places conditions on the licensee’s
subsequent sale of the licensed
item to duly notified third-party
purchasers?

LGE entered into a license agreement with Intel Corporation that
allowed Intel to “make, use, sell
(directly or indirectly), offer to sell,
import and otherwise dispose of all
Intel licensed parties.” In addition to
the basic agreement between Intel
and LGE, the license agreement
(which constituted the license itself
and an accompanying master agreement) also sought to limit the use of
the licensed Intel components with
non-Intel components. A number of
third parties, including petitioner

FACTS
Respondent LG Electronics, Inc.,
(LGE) owns a portfolio of patents,
among them the three patents in
dispute in this case (U.S. Patent
Nos. 4,939,641, 5,077,733, and
5,379,379). These patents aid in
conducting two common computing
tasks: (1) establishing memory
coherency between the main memory of the computer and the cache
memory (the high-speed memory
associated with the computer’s
microprocessor); and (2) establishing a rotating priority system that
allows different components of the
computer to communicate with the
“system bus,” a memory device that
operates as the hub of the computer
and connects the microprocessor

(Continued on Page 172)
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Case
at a
Glance
The patent exhaustion
doctrine ensures that
after the initial sale or
license to sell a patented
item, the patentee cannot
dispose or profit from any
subsequent resale of the
same patented item. This
case asks the Supreme
Court to analyze whether
this doctrine applies
when a patentee places
express conditions on a
patented item that will
exist after the initial sale
or license to sell that
patented item.

Quanta Computer, Inc., typically
purchase and then install Intel
microprocessors and chipsets into
their computers. The license sought
to impose two limits on the ability of
companies such as Quanta to use
the licensed Intel products in this
manner. First, the license stated that
no express or implied license existed
when third parties such as Quanta
combined the licensed Intel products with their separate products.
Second, the accompanying master
agreement required that a notice be
sent to third parties such as Quanta.
The notice stated that while that
patent license granted by LGE to
Intel covered Intel’s products, “it
does not extend, expressly or by
implication to any product that you
make by combining an Intel product
with any non-Intel product.” In due
course, Intel notified (although when
and to what extent is disputed) customers, such as Quanta, of this particular limitation.
LGE then sued Quanta and a number of other manufacturers for
patent infringement, contending
that combining the Intel microprocessors and chipset with nonIntel products infringed the relevant
patents. In LGE Electronics, Inc. v.
Asutek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp.
2d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2003), the U.S.
District Court for the Northern
District of California held that the
patent exhaustion doctrine applied
to the systems claims of the relevant patents. The patent exhaustion
also referred to as the “first sale
doctrine”), holds that a patentee or
an authorized licensee cannot assert
patent rights after the first sale or
license to sell of an article that
embodies the patented invention.
The district court, however, recognized that an expressly conditional
sale or license would not trigger the
patent exhaustion doctrine, and
held that the patent exhaustion doctrine did not apply to Intel’s sale to

customers such as Quanta. In particular, the notification letter from
Intel was not clear enough to
become an express condition on the
sale between Intel and its customers. By contrast, the district
court held that the patent exhaustion doctrine did not apply to all the
“method claims” of the disputed
patents. Relevant precedent indicated that the patentee’s sale of a
device did not exhaust his or her
rights under a separate patent that
teaches a method of accomplishing
a function.
The Federal Circuit, in LGE
Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom
Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2006), upheld the district
court’s holding as to the method
claims, but overturned its holding as
to the systems components. In
doing so, the Federal Circuit
stressed that two sales were at issue
in this case: the initial license agreement between LGE and Intel and
the subsequent sale of the components from Intel to its customers.
The Federal Circuit contended that
LGE’s actions did place express conditions on Intel’s subsequent customers. Two conditions, in particular, appeared to persuade the
Federal Circuit that LGE had appropriately conditioned Intel’s sale to
its customers. First, LGE had
included an express disclaimer in
the license that prevented Intel’s
customers from combining the
licensed parts with other non-Intel
components. Second, Intel’s notification to its customers of the terms
of the license clearly conditioned its
subsequent sale. The Federal
Circuit’s decision, in LGE
Electronics, is remarkable in that it
concluded that Intel’s brief disclosure to its customers could constitute an express condition on the
subsequent sale of an item. The
Supreme Court granted Quanta’s
petition for a writ of certiorari on
September 25, 2007.
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CASE ANALYSIS
The dispute between the parties in
Quanta Computer masks a deep
conflict over the scope of the patent
exhaustion doctrine. The relevance
of the patent exhaustion doctrine
has been unclear since the Federal
Circuit’s holding in Mallinckrodt
Inc. v. Medipart Inc., 976 F.2d 700
(Fed. Cir. 1992). In Mallinckrodt,
the Federal Circuit held that the
patent exhaustion doctrine will not
apply when a patentee places
express conditions upon the sale or
license to sell of an article that
embodies the essential features of
the relevant patent. This holding in
Mallinckrodt limits the use of the
patent exhaustion doctrine to those
circumstances in which the sale or
license to sell the patented article is
unconditional. The Federal Circuit’s
holding in Mallinckrodt has been
particularly controversial since it
may conflict with older Supreme
Court precedent such as United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S.
241 (1941). In Univis Lens, the
Supreme Court held that the patent
exhaustion doctrine was triggered
when a patentee attempted to place
conditions on the prices that retailers could charge for patented eyeglass lenses that had been purchased from a separate manufacturer. In Univis Lens, the Supreme
Court stated that the patent exhaustion doctrine is triggered when the
patentee sells any “uncompleted
article, which, because it embodies
essential features of his patented
invention, is within the protection
of his patent [and is] destined … to
be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent.” Univis Lens,
316 U.S. at 250-51. Resolving the
conflict between the relevant
Supreme Court precedent and
Federal Circuit precedent will drive
the outcome of Quanta Computer.
The petitioner, Quanta, asserts two
primary claims. First, Quanta argues
that LGE exhausted its patent rights
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upon Intel’s authorized sale to
Quanta because Intel sold it a product that embodied the essential features of the disputed patents and
had no other reasonable noninfringing uses. This initial claim
rests on a number of key themes.
The first theme is that the patent
exhaustion doctrine is an independent statutory limit on the scope of
a patentee’s rights that cannot be
contracted away by any relevant
party. Quanta attempts to underscore this first theme in various
ways. First, Quanta surveys a number of older cases, beginning with
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall)
453 (1873), which stress that the
patent exhaustion doctrine is a
statutory limit that cannot be eliminated by a contractual arrangement
between the relevant parties.
Second, Quanta attempts to distinguish the doctrine of patent exhaustion from the doctrine of implied
license. The doctrine of implied
license states that if a patentee does
not place conditions on the sale of a
product, then the patentee effectively promises not to interfere with the
purchaser’s reasonable enjoyment of
the patented product. Quanta contends these two doctrines are different from each other because the
doctrine of implied license is a quasi-contractual right that can be
repudiated while the patent exhaustion doctrine, by contrast, is a statutory limit placed on the patent owner and thus can never be repudiated
by contract. Quanta asserts that
Mallinckrodt improperly conflates
these two theories of recovery.
Third, Quanta stresses that the
patent exhaustion doctrine differs
from those rights enjoyed by the
patentee under a manufacturing
license because under such a
license, the patentee continues to
exert ongoing influence over the
patent. Quanta argues that once
Intel sold its components to its customers, it no longer exerted ongoing
influence over the patent.

Quanta’s next theme is linked to the
first—the patent exhaustion doctrine should not be conflated with
antitrust or patent misuse principles. Again, Quanta explicitly
rejects Mallinckrodt, arguing that
the Federal Circuit’s view that the
only issue as to patent exhaustion is
whether an express condition is
“reasonably within the patent grant
or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent grant into
behavior having an anti-competitive
act not justifiable under the ‘rule of
law’ ” is “incorrect and unworkable.” Once again, Quanta relies on
older precedent, which it contends
demonstrates that that patent
exhaustion doctrine should be interpreted in light of general property
principles, not antitrust principles.
Second, Quanta also attacks the
Federal Circuit’s decision in
Mallinckrodt because it relied on
antitrust principles rather than
property principles and, therefore,
is “circular and imposes no meaningful limits in practice.” In particular, Quanta critiques Mallinckrodt’s
reliance on articulating the proper
scope of the express conditions.
Quanta contends that under traditional patent exhaustion doctrine,
“no restrictions after an authorized
sale are ‘within the patent grant’
because the patentee’s monopoly is
exhausted.”
Quanta’s final theme in support of
its first claim is that an authorized
sale occurs when an unfinished article embodies the essential features
of the patent and no other reasonable use exists for an invention other than to “practice a patent” (in
other words, to use the patent for
the purpose for which it was intended) or to be finished in another
device. Quanta contends that each
of these elements is suggested by
the Supreme Court’s holding in
Univis Lens. Quanta argues the
exhaustion doctrine would be “dead
letter” if not “triggered by the sale

of components that embody essential features of the invention and are
within the protection of the patent.”
Quanta extends this insight to its
final key point—that the patent
exhaustion doctrine applies to
method patents as well. Again, relying on older precedent, Quanta contends that method claims are subject to exhaustion claims if the
method to be practiced is the only
reasonable use of the article. If
method claims are not covered by
the patent exhaustion doctrine,
Quanta asserts, the patentees will
simply include method claims in
their patents so as to avoid application of the doctrine.
Quanta’s second primary claim is
based on policy grounds. Initially,
Quanta maintains that Congress is
the appropriate party to limit the
scope of patent exhaustion. Quanta
then insists that policy and economic reasons support the continued
use of the patent exhaustion doctrine. According to Quanta, the
patent exhaustion doctrine: (1)
reflects the continuing importance
of property principles in outlining
the scope of a patent grant; (2)
reduces transaction costs without
reducing the patentee’s reward since
the patentee, by negotiating for the
highest price for one potential customer, does not have to engage in
multiple transactions with subsequent purchasers; and (3) prevents
potential antitrust abuse by the
patent owner. Conversely, the
Federal Circuit’s policy—in its
extension of the patent exhaustion
doctrine and its refusal to apply the
patent exhaustion doctrine to
method claims—distorted the commercial relationships between
patentees and purchasers.
The respondent, LGE, counters with
three basic claims. Initially, LGE
argues that the sale of one component could not exhaust a patent
claim when the component is part
(Continued on Page 174)
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of a separately patented system.
According to LGE, “the components
which petitioners purchased from
Intel are independent and distinct
products from the patented systems
that petitioners now claim ‘authority’ to practice.” In support of this
claim, LGE raises four arguments.
First, it contends that the fact that
the Patent and Trademark Office
issued more than one patent in this
case demonstrates that the sale of
one article does not exhaust rights
in multiple patents. Second, LGE
argues that while the patent exhaustion doctrine may be triggered once
the patent has been sold, that doctrine does not limit the patentee’s
ability to control other rights listed
in 35 U.S.C. § 154, such as the right
to make or sell the product. Third,
LGE argues that the doctrine of
implied license is the doctrine most
appropriately directed to the sale of
an article when patents exist in
both the article and accompanying
systems. According to LGE, the doctrine of implied license is more suited to the circumstances at stake in
Quanta because the doctrine
“focuses on the conduct and intent
of the parties, to determine whether
they could reasonably anticipate
that the purchaser would receive a
license to practice the separate
patented system or process.”
Finally, LGE attempts to counter
Quanta’s claim that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Univis Lens
applies to this case. LGE argues that
unlike the patented eyeglass lens
that was in dispute in Univis Lens,
Quanta fundamentally altered the
microprocessors and chipsets
licensed to it by Intel when it combined them with non-Intel components to make a new product.
Next, LGE contends that a patentee
could restrict the ability of licensors
to allow their customers to fully practice the patent. Such a position,
argues LGE, is fully consistent with

precedent, such as Gen. Talking
Pictures Corp., v. Western Electric
Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938), which
states patentees can enforce any
number of conditions on manufacturing licenses so long as such restrictions are enacted before the sale of a
given product. Moreover, LGE claims
that a patentee could continue to
place conditions on the “making” of
an item even after such an item was
sold or used. Thus, the patent
exhaustion doctrine would not be
triggered if Quanta continued to
“make” the relevant patented article
after Intel’s initial “sale” of the article
to Quanta. This position allows LGE
to minimize the importance of
Mallinckrodt as relevant precedent
since, in that case, the “issue
involved not the validity of a restriction on ‘making’ the article, but
instead, the enforceability of a
restriction on the ‘use’ of the article.”
Finally, LGE argues that even if the
rights in the component patent were
exhausted, the claims in the methods still were actionable. LGE
argues the patent exhaustion doctrine should not be applied to
process patents because they differed significantly from other types
of patents. In support of its claims,
LGE states that “[r]ights in a
process patent are not linked to a
tangible article, but, rather represent the means by which a particular task is accomplished or item is
produced.” Therefore, the patent
exhaustion doctrine could not
address the unique issues raised by
method claims.

to third-party purchasers may
decrease the ability of manufacturers to conduct flexible business
transactions. In particular, manufacturers may be harmed when many
different components are included
in one product and the manufacturer would have to negotiate a separate licensing price for each component. For many patentees, however,
the ability to fully exploit their
patents may be harmed by an overly
harsh patent exhaustion doctrine
that could potentially prevent
patentees from exploiting the product through “downstream” licensing
agreements. Thus, both sides have a
significant interest in the ultimate
outcome of Quanta.
Quanta Computer has also generated a significant amount of interest
in the patent community of lawyers
and scholars. The Federal Circuit’s
decision in Mallinckrodt has been
the cause of significant controversy.
Scholars, in particular, have focused
on its seeming inconsistency with
previous Supreme Court precedent
such as Univis Lens. Univis Lens,
however, was decided within the
context of a much different antitrust
regime than the present one (as
seen in the Court’s decision in
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006). Thus, Quanta Computer
offers a unique opportunity for the
Supreme Court to assess the impact
of its own precedent on the Federal
Circuit.

SIGNIFICANCE
Quanta Computer has significant
practical interest for the manufacturing community. Manufacturing
today is often characterized by complex licensing arrangements that
may involve many purchasers. The
ability of patentees to “passthrough” the conditions on a license
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